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By the end of the 1990s, inefficiency, excess supply and low service quality characterized the mass transit 
system of Bogotá. The average travel time to work was one hour and ten minutes, obsolete buses 
provided public transport, traffic generated 70 percent of air pollution and there were frequent traffic 
accidents. To address all of these issues, the municipal and national governments designed and put in 
place a new mass transit system named TransMilenio (TM), which came into operation in January 2001. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze Bogotá’s mass transit system before and after TM, study the 
political economy of its adoption process and conduct a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of the first phase of 
the system. The new transit system is a hybrid model that combines public planning of the network 
structure, route tendering conditions, regulation and supervision, as well as private operation of the 
separated functions of revenue collection and transport service. The adoption of this new model needed to 
resolve delicate political economy issues that characterized private transport systems in many developing 
countries. The new organization had a sizeable impact on TM users’ by improving traveling conditions 
significantly. In addition, congestion, pollution and traffic accidents plummeted in TM corridors. However, 
the type of transition adopted for the remaining transport corridors not covered by TM caused unforeseen 
negative spillovers, as a consequence of slow scrapping rates and bus and routes relocation. 
Consequently, although the CBA for the first phase of the corridors covered by TM is positive, once these 
additional measures are taken into consideration, the net effect is negative due primarily to increases in 
travel time for passengers using the traditional transport system. In order to minimize the negative 
spillovers during the full implementation of TM, expected to last until 2015, integration of the traditional 
and new systems should be carried on, and strict regulation of the traditional public transport system 
should be crafted.  
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ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO DE TRANSMILENIO, EL SISTEMA DE 
TRANSPORTE PÚBLICO DE BOGOTÁ 
 
Resumen 
A finales de la década de los 90 el sistema de transporte masivo en Bogotá estaba caracterizado por 
ineficiencias, exceso de oferta y una baja calidad en el servicio. El tiempo de viaje promedio era de una 
hora y diez minutos, el servicio era proporcionado por buses obsoletos, el tráfico vehicular generaba el 70 
por ciento de la polución y los accidentes de tránsito eran frecuentes. Para solucionar todos estos 
problemas, los gobiernos distrital y nacional diseñaron e implementaron un nuevo sistema de transporte 
masivo llamado TransMilenio (TM), el cual inició operaciones en Enero de 2001. El propósito de este 
artículo es examinar el sistema de transporte masivo en Bogotá antes y después de la implementación de 
TM, analizar la economía política del proceso de adopción y transición y llevar a cabo un análisis costo-
beneficio (CBA) de la primera fase del sistema. El nuevo sistema de tránsito es un modelo híbrido que 
combina la planeación pública de la infraestructura, asignación de las rutas, regulación y coordinación así 
como la operación privada de las diferentes funciones de recolección de ingresos y servicios de 
transporte. La adopción e implementación de este nuevo sistema debía resolver delicados problemas de 
economía política que caracterizan a los sistemas privados de transporte en muchos países en 
desarrollo. La nueva organización del sistema de transporte masivo tuvo un impacto considerable sobre 
los usuarios de TM, al mejorar significativamente las condiciones del servicio y reducir la congestión, 
polución y los accidentes de tránsito en los corredores de TM. Sin embargo, el tipo de transición que se 
adoptó generó externalidades negativas sobre los otros corredores de la ciudad debido a las bajas tasas 
de chatarrización y a la consecuente reubicación de rutas y buses. Por lo tanto, aunque el CBA para los 
corredores de TM arroja resultados positivos, una vez se toman en consideración las externalidades 
sobre los otros corredores, el efecto neto es negativo principalmente debido al aumento en el tiempo de 
viaje para los usuarios del sistema tradicional. Para minimizar estas externalidades negativas, durante la 
implementación completa de TM que irá hasta el 2015, se deben integrar los dos sistemas y adoptar una 
estricta regulación sobre el sistema tradicional de transporte público.  
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1.   Introduction 
During the nineties, mass transit in Bogotá was characterized by inefficiency, excess 
supply and low quality service. The average travel time to work was one hour ten 
minutes, obsolete buses provided public transport, average speed could reach ten 
km/hour during peak hours, 70 percent of air pollution was generated by traffic, and 
traffic accidents were frequent. City transport was in the hands of private entrepreneurs 
and local authorities were in charge of regulating the system and the provision and 
maintenance of the road infrastructure. By the end of the decade, a new mass transit 
system, named TransMilenio (TM), was designed and partially implemented to solve 
these large inefficiencies of mass transit in Bogotá.  
TransMilenio significantly improved traveling conditions for its users and reduced traffic 
externalities on served corridors. The system reduced travel times for TM users by 32 
percent, particulate matter pollution fell by nine percent in some areas of the city and 
accident rates dropped by 90 percent in the TM corridors. By 2015, the complete TM 
system is expected to transport 80 percent of the city’s population at an average speed 
of 25 km/h with a service quality similar to an underground metro system. 
These achievements result from a careful, hybrid scheme designed to overcome many 
market failures that plague the provision of mass transit in developing countries. The 
public participation in the network configuration, the route tendering conditions and the 
system regulation and supervision, is accompanied by the private operation of buses; 
the vertical separation among the transportation service and the fare collection process 
broke the link between passenger-trips serviced and profits; the allocation of exclusive 
property rights over a route and a competitive tendering process to give the right to 
operate on a route, are among the most salient features on the design of TM.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the process leading to the implementation of TM 
and evaluate the impact of the first phase of the new system. We explore three issues. 
First, we analyze the market failures prevalent in the provision of public transport. 
Second, we describe the mass transit system in Bogotá before and after TM and study 
the political economy of the process. Lastly, we examine the impact of TM on the quality   4
of life of inhabitants in Bogotá and conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the first phase of 
TM.  
The results of this paper show that three factors contributed to the smooth transition 
from the existing mass transit system in Bogotá to the adoption of TM. First, the excess 
supply of buses exerted, by the end of the nineties, a costly toll upon the public transport 
system: economic rents declined and never recuperated the high peak reached at the 
end of the eighties. Second, the Local Government convinced traditional firms to support 
TM by allowing them to join the new system as operators and to continue supplying 
services in unserved TM corridors. Thus, traditional firms derived benefits from 
participating in TM and in the traditional system. Moreover, the structure of the traditional 
system was not modified; regulation was still weak and fares provided incentives to the 
entry of new buses. Third, the scrapping of buses was slow, promoting the relocation of 
these vehicles to unserved TM corridors, which reduced the losses to the politically 
powerful group of traditional transporters from adopting TM. However, the relocation of 
buses produced negative spillovers to unserved corridors; thus, congestion, pollution 
and travel times for riders of the traditional system worsened. Despite the sizeable 
impact TM had on its users, the net benefits of implementing the first phase are negative 
as a result of the spillovers caused by the slow scrapping rates and the maintenance of 
a weak regulation of the traditional system. A similar system is now being implemented 
on other smaller cities around Colombia with weaker political and regulatory commitment 
from municipal authorities. 
The paper provides important policy lessons for cities planning to undertake similar 
reforms in the sector in developing countries. On the one hand, political hurdles could 
dampen the reform of the sector. The paper contributes to understand the political 
economy process by which the local and national authorities involved the private 
entrepreneurs, previously operating the deficient mass transit system, in the 
development of a new scheme. On the other hand, the cost-benefit analysis identifies 
policy mistakes during the implementation of TM that lead to negative spillovers, 
reducing the benefits of TM. Recognizing upfront these risks is useful to avoid similar 
mistakes in cities that are planning to reform their mass transit system.     5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 revises the market failures prevailing in the 
provision of public transport. Section 3 describes the mass transit system of Bogotá 
before TM, illustrates the main characteristics of the new system, and discusses the 
political economy in its design and implementation. Changes in the quality of life, 
positive or negative, resulting from the new mass transit system as well as of its 
particular adoption and the cost-benefit analysis are included in Section 4. Concluding 
remarks are presented in Section 5. 
2.  Market failures in urban bus services in developing countries
1 
Many cities in developing countries have experienced a pendulum in the operation of 
their public transit system. Bogotá, for instance, evolved from originally privately owned 
trolley buses at the end of the ninetieth century to a fully public bus system in the first 
half of the twentieth. The second half of last century witnessed a slow transition back to 
private ownership due to the lack of flexibility and productive inefficiencies that became 
characteristic features of state ownership and operation. The mixed success of the last 
decades with regard of private provision, liberalization and competition in the market 
especially in the cities of developing countries led to a reconsideration of this model, and 
the adoption of so-called hybrid models that combine public and private features. The 
main reason for this paradigm shift is the evidence of market failures that hinder a fully 
private provision to reach socially optimal outcomes. 
Market failures in the provision of urban mass transit include: unclear definition of 
property rights on the curbside and on the road; fares set above the competitive 
equilibrium levels; misalignment between the incentives of bus drivers and owners; and 
finally, congestion and pollution. In developing countries, these market failures are 
exacerbated by weak regulation and enforcement. 
Property rights are usually not clearly defined on the road or on the curbside (Klein et al, 
1997). The absence of properly defined “rights to waiting passengers” implies that the 
fare from a pedestrian at the curb does not belong exclusively to the firm authorized to 
                                                 
1 This section draws upon Estache and Gómez-Lobo (2004).    6
operate on that route. Taking advantage of the lack of regulation and control and of the 
fact that waiting time is costly
2, other means of transportation can interlope and offer the 
pedestrian a ride.  
However, the implication of this lack of property rights differs in developed and 
developing countries. Since demand for mass transit in developed countries is low and 
is induced by a regular high quality service, investments on mass transit may not be 
recuperated given that any competitor can take away passengers. This induces 
underinvestment. On the other hand, demand in developing countries is “thick”
3, fares 
are high, and excessive bus entry is the norm, resulting in strong competition for 
passengers on the curb. This strong competition spurs distortions in investment such as 
deficient quality service and the use of small vehicles, which are more maneuverable, 
but produce more pollution, congestion, large investment per seat, and safety problems 
(Estache and Gómez-Lobo, 2004). 
Fares are usually set above the competitive equilibrium levels, which may also promote 
an excessive number of buses. Because buses are not perfect substitutes, price 
competition is not an effective mechanism to regulate the optimal quantity of buses in 
the market. To minimize waiting time, riders prefer to use the first bus that arrives even 
though in a few minutes a cheaper bus may come along. Time, and not fares, is the 
most important decision variable for the rider; therefore, the bus can exercise its “market 
power” by raising fares. As a result, they are above efficient levels and returns to 
investment are high, creating incentives for the entry and an excessive number of buses 
on the road (Evans, 1987). This excessive supply of buses paired with a deficient quality 
service lead to congestion, pollution, and traffic accidents.  
A second source of market failures is the misalignment between the interests of the bus 
driver and the bus owner, introducing further inefficiencies in the provision of mass 
transit. The profits of bus owners depend on the number of passengers carried per bus. 
In order to align the interests of bus owners and drivers, the payment of bus drivers is 
typically based on the number of passengers carried. This contract between the owner 
                                                 
2 There is evidence that passengers consider waiting time more costly than travel time. 
3 In fact, most of the population in these countries lacks other alternatives of transportation.   7
and the driver introduces however further complications on the provision of mass transit. 
On the one hand, bus drivers compete for passengers to maximize their payments, 
causing safety problems and congestion. On the other, this compensation scheme 
promotes the use of smaller buses, despite the congestion and pollution problems, 
because they are better equipped to compete for passengers (Estache y Gómez Lobo, 
2004). 
When drivers are responsible for fare collection, the problems described above are 
deepened and new inefficiencies arise. The high costs of monitoring the driver cause the 
atomization of the bus industry in terms of bus ownership, in order to bring closer the 
interests of bus owners and drivers. Although this atomization is effective to align the 
interest of the owner and drivers, additional costs emerge. The large number of owners 
makes it difficult to exploit economies of scale on coordination as well as economies of 
density.  
The aforementioned market failures are worsened by deficient regulation, weak 
enforcement and capture of institutions. The next section examines the evolution of 
mass transit in Bogotá using the framework described in this section and emphasizing 
as well on policy failures that were present in the city.  
3. TransMilenio’s  background, features and adoption process 
The mass transit system of Bogotá before 2001 was characterized by an oversupply of 
vehicles operating at a level where inefficiencies in production and negative congestion 
externalities were present. How this situation emerged and was maintained throughout 
decades, and how a completely new system as TM was enacted against powerful 
vested interests, with a relatively low political turmoil in a surprisingly short span
4, are 
questions that demand an exploration of the political economy of the transition process. 
The purpose of this section is to examine the mass transit system before TM, the 
solution implemented, and the political economy process associated with its adoption.  
                                                 
4 It took less than three years from the moment in which the original decision was made and the 
inauguration of the first line of TM.   8
The Mass Transit System before TM 
The structure that characterized the public transportation system of Bogotá in the 
second half of the twentieth century until the implementation of TM can be divided into 
three periods: (i) simultaneous provision by state and privately owned buses (until the 
mid-1980s); (ii) privately owned buses and affiliation firms with weak quality 
discrimination (until the early 1990s); and (iii) private provision with strong quality 
discrimination (from the early 1990s to the present). This type of evolution was not 
exclusive to Bogotá, but shared with many other cities of developing countries.  
During an initial phase of the period 1940 - mid 1980s, mass transit was exclusively 
provided by a public company; resulting in inefficiencies, excess drivers per vehicle and 
inflexibility in supplying sufficient transport services and new routes for a growing city 
(Urrutia et al., 1981). Increasingly, the regulatory agency solved the insufficient supply of 
buses and routes by allowing for participation of private firms in the provision of public 
transport, the decisions related to new routes and the determination of the number of 
vehicles running on each corridor.  
The new scheme, allowing for participation of private owners, had three types of actors: 
the local government, bus owners, and firms acting as intermediaries between them. 
The local government granted stable routes and fare subsidies to private firms. To the 
bus owner, authorization to operate on a certain route (i.e. affiliation) involved the 
purchase of one of the fixed number of slots approved by the authority, and the payment 
of an affiliation and a monthly fee
5 to the affiliating firm. Affiliating firms were not 
necessarily proper transportation companies but could act only as intermediaries with 
the role of gaining governmental approval (licenses) for routes and affiliating vehicles to 
guarantee a level of service. No contract between the government and the firms existed.  
At the beginning of the 1980s, the fare subsidy system, which constituted a sufficient 
return for the investment, became the main factor in determining the number of buses in 
service; however, it created incentives to purchase buses and use them for six hours, 
                                                 
5 In 1995, the cost per slot was between US$2,300 and US$4,600, the affiliation fee ranged between 
US$100 and US$600 and the monthly fee varied between US$35 and US$5 (Lleras, 2003).   9
the span necessary to receive the subsidy. Typically, drivers utilized more than one 
vehicle during their daily shift in order to collect the government subsidy.  
During the eighties, the gradual elimination of subsidies led to two types of 
developments. First, higher fares were granted to non-subsidy vehicles, obliged to 
comply with better quality conditions. This was the first experience of price discrimination 
based on quality, a tool that would become important at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Second, the industry intensified its organizational structure, separating even more the 
affiliating firms, the bus owners and the drivers. Bogotá did not liberalize fares at any 
point in time, as it was the case in Santiago de Chile (Estache and Gomez-Lobo, 2004), 
but let them to be set by the regulator agency, allegedly subject to capture by the 
priv7ate operators and prone to accept high fares. 
The atomization of the ownership structure was caused by the high costs of monitoring 
the revenue collection of each bus, responsibility of each driver. This solution of the 
agency problem mentioned above led the affiliating firms to specialize in obtaining 
routes from the authorities and affiliating as many buses as possible. Since aging of the 
existing fleet increased the cost of owning old vehicles, the firms sold them, usually to 
the drivers themselves, and owned only new buses
6. At this point the number of vehicles 
on the streets was completely determined by the affiliating firms, because the public 
company had been liquidated. The firms obtained as many routes and buses as possible 
because they earned more revenues from affiliation than from the number of passengers 
transported in their own buses, restricted to ten percent of the fleet. The firms also 
established a cartel to consistently push for higher bus fares
7 and the authorization of 
longer bus usage lives as well as to avoid price competition. This structure intensified 
their struggle for economic rents, led to an increase in the number of buses in the 
streets, and allowed for aging of the vehicle fleet.  
                                                 
6 The increase of drivers-owners as a solution of the limited monitoring capacity of the affiliating firms is 
also documented by Estache and Gomez-Lobo (2004) for the case of Santiago de Chile. 
7 Bus fares were historically agreed upon through costly negotiation processes with the local authorities. 
Only in 1997 an effort was put forth to tie them to a transport good basket (Decree 3109 of 1997).   10
As Figure 1 illustrates, the bus fleet of public transit vehicles in Bogotá grew steadily 
during the last three decades. Because fares were constantly adjusted upwards, 
revenues per passenger increased permanently, providing incentives for entry.  



































BUSETA EJECUTIVA SUPEREJECUTIVA TOTAL BUSETAS VEHICLES  
Source: Authors calculations based on DANE 
Estache and Gomez-Lobo (2004) propose a model for explaining the over provision of 
services in a private equilibrium when fares are too high. The key argument is the fact 
that buses are not perfect substitutes, but differentiated products. Hence, the bus 
stopping in front of a passenger enjoys a “market power” over its competitors due to the 
cost-of-waiting, highly valued by eventual passengers; this permits it charging a higher 
fare. Consequently, rising tariffs create excessive returns to investment and promote the 
entry of new buses beyond the socially efficient level (see p. 12-15). As a result of 
excessive entry, buses in Bogotá and Santiago de Chile have witnessed a sharp decline 
in occupancy, as it will be illustrated below.  
In the case of Bogotá, the steady average fare increase also stemmed from the strong 
lobbying capacity of the public transport sector and the quality discrimination strategy 
adopted by private firms
8. As Figure 2 illustrates, from 1975 to 2004, the average fare 
increased from US$0.10 to US $0.40, in constant 1999 dollars. Since Bogotá did not 
                                                 
8 The quality discrimination strategy implemented by private firms was successful since the fares for 
busetas and colectivos, small sized-vehicles with faster service, were set 2.5 times higher in contrast to 
the normal bus fare.   11
experiment with fare liberalization, these fare increments were mostly the result of a 
strong bargaining power of private transport firms attained during the 1980s
9.  

























































PASSANGERS PER VEHICLE FARE 1999 USD CENTS  
Source: Authors calculations based on DANE 
The declining trend in average occupancy remained through the rest of the decade: the 
daily number of passengers per vehicle, fell dramatically from 538 in 1992 to 294 in 
2003. The constant fare hikes offset the subsequent income losses, and served as an 
incentive for the entry of more vehicles and further reductions in the number of 
passengers per vehicle. 
The economic rents, determined by high fares, provided incentives for the entry of new 
vehicles and delayed the exit of old ones. In order to estimate the rents for Bogotá’s 
mass transit system, the contracts between affiliating firms and owners/drivers were 
simulated (see Annex I). Figure 3. presents the results and shows that the sector 
operated at efficiency levels during two periods: the end of the 1970s and the beginning of 
the 1990s. Besides these two periods, economic rents were positive and substantial, and 
varied sharply. In particular, during the eighties rents grew along with fare increments 
from US$0.10 to US $0.30, a change associated with the introduction of smaller capacity 
vehicles. Interestingly, rents accrued to both the fleet administrating firms and the bus 
owners/drivers.  
                                                 
9 Private transporters started to participate in politics either directly via their own candidates in the city 
council or indirectly via funding the campaign of traditional politicians.  
   12
However, the composition of rents changed during the nineties. Rents accrued mainly 
from affiliation, and rents for bus owners/drivers were small and contingent upon the 
number of passengers. Consequently, rent distribution shifted and favored the affiliating 
firms, as Figure 3. shows. The figure also reveals that during the nineties the total daily 
rents never returned to the peak observed at the end of the eighties.  







































































































OWNER-DRIVER FLEET ADMINISTRATOR  
Source: Authors calculations based on DANE 
 
At the beginning of the nineties, the affiliation firms lobbied for further price 
discrimination based on quality. The so-called “executive” services, with only sitting 
passengers, newer vehicles and faster service started to compete in the streets at 
higher fares. Again, the three types of actors involved, firms, owners and drivers, 
obtained benefits at the expense of passengers, due to the acceptance by the 
authorities of this new price setting mechanism. It has been widely argued that this 
behavior reveals either the capture of the regulator or ignorance regarding the true costs 
of bus transportation, or both.  
As a consequence, a market failure due to the absence of price competition in urban bus 
transport was exacerbated by a policy failure that granted free affiliating privileges to 
these firms and periodic fare negotiation with a cartel, leading to systematic economic 
rents. In addition, this incentive scheme forced bus drivers to engage in a strong 
competition for passengers along the central corridors. Drivers did not respect assigned   13
bus stops or delineated areas for bus transit in the pursuit of passengers and, in the 
extreme, did not respect route-assignment at all
10.  
At the end of the 1990s the excess bus supply, coupled with a substantial increase of 
private vehicles, exceeded the traffic capacity of Bogotá. From 1991 to 1995, the 
number of cars registered in Bogotá increased by 75 percent and 40 percent of the 
country’s vehicles were circulating in the city (Lozano, 2003). By 1998, private cars 
occupied 64 percent of the road space and mobilized only 19 percent of the population 
(Chaparro, 2002). Moreover, the public transportation fleet doubled during the period 
1980-1999 reaching a total of 22,031 buses (Lleras, 2003).  
As a result, gridlock was commonplace, accidents abounded and travel times were 
unbelievably high. Estimates show that in 1995 the average number of daily trips per 
household was 11.9, the average number of daily trips per person was 1.7 and the total 
number of daily trips surpassed 10 million
11. The average speed for public transportation 
vehicles was ten kilometers per hour and in peak hours average speed could drop to five 
km/hour (Chaparro, 2002). Inequality of travel times between public transport users and car 
owners was sizeable. Mean travel time was 66.8 minutes for public transport users 
whereas car owners faced a mean travel time of 42.6 minutes (Lleras, 2003). These 
problems finally led to a rethinking of the entire bus transport system in Bogotá and to the 
design and partial implementation of the TM system by 2001.  
The features of TransMilenio 
The form of intervention adopted with TM had precedents. During the 1980s the 
authorities created exclusive bus lanes along the most important south-north corridor in 
the city, while leaving the structure of the public transport system described above intact; 
Curitiba-type reforms were already proposed; and finally, under the leadership of the 
National Government, a metro system was under consideration. Thus, there was a real 
possibility of comprehensive intervention to reform the existing system. 
                                                 
10 The road infighting among drivers for every extra passenger is locally known as “the penny war” (La 
guerra del centavo). 
11 During 2000, Hong Kong, with a population similar to Bogotá (7’394.170 inhabitants), reported 12 million 
total daily trips.    14
The elements of the new system that lie at the center of the transformation and seem 
worth looking at more slowly are: (i) the Bus Rapid Transit system; (ii) the concession 
contracts for service providers (TM transporters and feeder buses); (iii) the vertical 
separation among the transportation service and the fare collection process; and (iv) the 
new price setting procedures.  
TransMilenio is “a flexible, rubber-tired rapid transit mode that combines stations, 
vehicles, services, and driving lanes, …into an integrated system.” (Lleras, 2003). 
Designed for 35.000 passengers per hour per direction, the first phase of TM covers 
42.4 kilometers of exclusive bus lanes along three of the main transit corridors (see Map 
1). In these corridors, central lanes are exclusively set for the operation of TM, and 
passengers at the stations are their exclusive customers. The stations are located in the 
middle of the road facilitating the transfer between buses, mimicking the metro system. 
The bus stops are 57 stations, located every 700 meters, and are equipped with pay 
booths, registering machines, surveillance cameras, and infrastructure such as bridges, 
pedestrian crossings and traffic lights designed to ease the entrance of passengers into 
the system. At the end of the corridors, three principal access stations were built as the 
meeting point for the feeder buses, and buses from the traditional system that work in 
the neighboring municipalities. Feeder bus passengers have an integrated tariff so riders 
do not have to pay twice for using the feeder system and TM.  
Map 1. First lines of TransMilenio: Ave. Caracas-Autop. Norte and Ave. 80 
 
 
Source: Transmileno S.A.   15
The bus fleet for the first phase of the system is constituted by 470 buses, characterized 
by having superior mechanic conditions and environmental performance than those of 
the Traditional System. Feeder buses, sharing corridors with the traditional system, have 
bus stops every 300 meters in the lower socioeconomic areas of the city and are 
synchronized by the operators with a satellite system in order to minimize traveling and 
waiting times for passengers.
12  
Finally, TM designed a pre payment scheme, where users buy tickets in paying booths 
located in the stations, just as in underground systems around the world. Therefore, bus 
drivers do not have to deal with collecting payment fares as happens in buses operating 
in the traditional system. The organizational scheme of service delivery through 
exclusive bus transit lanes and closed stations implies a clear definition of property 
rights on the road and curbside.  
Under the TM system the transportation service is organized through concession 
contracts awarded by public competition. Transport providers, both local and foreign, are 
called to associate and participate under a new set of rules. The new transport firms are 
to own a number of buses that meet certain specifications, whose operation is subject to 
the leadership of a central authority, TransMilenio S.A.. These buses have a specified 
usage life stipulated at the outset of the contracts. The concessions expire when the 
vehicle fleet reaches an average mileage of 850,000 kilometers, with no bus individually 
reaching more than 1,000,000 kilometers. If the average mileage threshold is reached 
prior to ten years, then the concession extends to the 10th year. If, on the contrary, the 
average mileage threshold has not been reached by year 10, the concession lasts until 
this happens or until year 15, whichever comes first
13.  
In addition, the income of the concessionaries is no longer associated to the number of 
passenger-trips serviced. The new contracts establish a per kilometer traveled payment. 
The number of kilometers traveled depends on the manner in which the central authority 
dispatches service and, ultimately, on demand. In fact, reward per kilometer traveled is 
                                                 
12 Each TM bus has a capacity of transporting 160 passengers while Feeder buses can transport 70 
passengers.  
13 There is a restriction by which the concessionaire is forbidden to add new vehicles to the fleet to 
deliberately bring its average mileage down when a certain portion of the concession period has expired. 
This contract resembles those analyzed by Engel et al (2001).    16
the central variable by which the firms compete for these contracts. TransMilenio S.A. 
has thorough calculations of the costs involved in the provision of the transportation 
service, as well as demand forecasts, allowing it to set the range of acceptable fees per 
kilometer traveled. This range is set to guarantee a “fair” return to the participating 
investors
14 and is used as a parameter in the selection process of the concessionaries. 
In this way, TM creates a hybrid-model that replaces competition on the road by 
competition for the road (Estache and Gomez-Lobo, 2004). 
With these measures, the entire incentive scheme of the previous system is turned 
upside down. The affiliating firm and the license business disappear, and the ability to 
gain from cutting maintenance costs also disappears since the service is to be provided 
during a specified time period under some safety and efficiency standards; cutting down 
on costs today will imply incurring greater costs tomorrow in order to comply. The firm 
comes into existence as a true transport firm able to earn a return on its capital 
comparable to what it would receive in any other business of comparable risk.  
Feeder buses are also organized through concession contracts awarded by competition. 
The contracts here are slightly different: they are awarded for a 10-year period subject to 
the condition that no individual vehicle should reach more than 950,000 kilometers 
during the time of the concession, and income to the feeder buses is defined as a 
combination of revenues from a payment per kilometer traveled and a payment per 
passenger served. The reward system is designed to prevent opportunistic behavior 
from the transport firms. Feeder buses bring passengers from outskirt locations into the 
TM system, but most of the time they do not transit on exclusive public transport lanes, 
making it impossible to control for the kilometers they travel. The regulating authority, 
TransMilenio S.A., has calculated the maximum fixed operation costs that a firm will 
incur per bus and agrees to pay a per kilometer traveled fee. Under this rule traveling 
without passengers becomes unprofitable for the feeder bus.  
                                                 
14 This range is given by a real return on investment between 14% and 16%.   17
Taking the responsibility of collecting fares away from the bus drivers
15 and centralizing 
the management of fare revenues under an independent fiduciary entity is another 
element that contributes to the improved operation of the new system. Booths at the TM 
stations collect revenues of the system, and they are managed through a fiduciary 
contract. This not only relieves the system of information asymmetries and aids in the 
collection of taxes, it also has a considerable impact on road safety.
16 
The last important element of the new scheme is the fare setting procedure. Under TM, 
travel fares cease to be negotiable. The contracts written subject the concessionaires to 
operate under the fares set by the regulating authority, TransMilenio S.A.. The fare 
setting procedure and fare adjustment over time form part of the contracts. TM travel 
fares are set to cover the long-run average costs of operation, including the 
administration costs of the regulating authority and costs of the fiduciary contract 
through which fare revenues are managed. 
An upfront decision made during the design stage of TM was that fares would not be set 
to recover the infrastructure investments since that would render the system not 
feasible. TM fares set to recover the operation costs of the system were already 
significantly higher than the current bus fares. Investment in the infrastructure required 
to operate the system was said to be social investment, and TM’s infrastructure 
thereafter became “social infrastructure.”   
After the introduction of the first lines of TM, buses from the traditional system continue 
to mobilize nearly 80 percent of the population, with approximately six million 
passengers a day. Despite the concession contracts for TM obliged the operators to 
purchase and scrap buses that previously operated in TM corridors, only 1,410 buses 
were effectively scrapped and the remaining 6,000 buses were relocated into unserved 
TM corridors. Although the demand for the old system dropped, and consequently 
revenues per vehicle fell, a loose regulation of the system permitted and favored the 
excessive entry and the over provision of services in these corridors. Moreover, once 
TM came into operation the fares for the traditional system were tied to the TM fares, 
                                                 
15 In the previous system, passengers paid the drivers upon entering the buses, a distraction to the drivers 
that contributed to congestion and accidents. 
16 At the moment, regulator lacks a direct monitoring instrument for the fare collection contract.    18
and, as illustrated in Figure 4. Consequently the introduction of TM did not spur a 
substantial reduction in the transport fleet of buses from the traditional system.  















































































































Source: TransMilenio S.A. 
 
The political economy of TransMilenio’s adoption  
Against all odds, the political struggles associated with TM’s adoption were surprisingly 
minor. The traditional firms had derived substantial, although fluctuating rents over the 
decades and understood the political leverage necessary to effectively determine bus 
fares. However, with the possibility of having to face a completely new system, these 
actors considered that they had plenty to loose. Negotiations between the local 
government and representatives of the traditional transport system went on for more 
than one year. Convincing them that there were ripe gains from adopting the new 
system, both for the city as a whole and for transport business in particular, demanded a 
comprehensive strategy.  
The crucial issues of the strategy leading to the alignment of traditional bus owners with 
the local government were, first, the fact that at the end of the 1990s public transport-
related problems like congestion, pollution and accidents reached worrying levels. 
Second, they had also already experienced policy changes that affected them and which 
they were not able to counter, like the abolition of subsidies and the levying of a gasoline 
tax. Therefore, at the end of the 1990s they faced a growing consensus in favor of a 
regime change, either in the form of a subway or a transformation of the bus system.    19
As Estache and Gomez-Lobo (2004) document for the case of Santiago de Chile, where 
strikes against the reform to the liberalized regime allowed for extractions of 
considerable rents, in Bogotá there were also several episodes of protest. It is 
interesting though that the strikes and protests lost momentum quite rapidly and TM-
related ones were outnumbered by other issues. Table 1 shows that between 1999 and 
2000 there were five events against TM; at the same time other issues produced greater 
concern than the new system. Indeed, even at the peak of TM related protests, they 
represented only one fifth of the total political demonstrations in the sector. By 2001 
activity against this initiative had already ceased.  
 
Table 1. Transport related demonstrations in Bogotá, 1999-2001 
 
Another important factor facilitating the transition was the National Government’s 
decision to support a new transportation system for Bogotá. Indeed, the willingness of 
the central government to partly finance the infrastructure investments associated with it 
became a critical argument to convince transporters that this was the right time for 
reform. During the 1990s Colombian presidents supported alternatively either a subway 
or a bus solution. Consequently, the mayoral candidates for Bogotá and the elected 
mayor followed suit, praising the system the Nation was willing to support. Any solution 
Number of protests, strikes and threats of strikes














1999 3 6 1 1 1 1 13 15
2000 1 2 3 1 1 11311 42 1
2001 1 2 3 0
T o t a l 123 1 0 121222312 91 7
TM: TransMilenio related events.
Protest: spontaneous gathering to demonstrate against transport regulation
Strike: organized protest, planned and convoked in advanced 
Source: CINEP base on newspaper information, Bogotá.
THREAT OF STRIKE
(1) This refers to protests initiated by taxi drivers and were related to policies and regulations specific to their service. 
Threat of strike: some strikes were announced to press the authorities in relation to certain issues but they were canceled before they started.
(2) Transporters covering suburban routes were forced to pay new or higher tolls, leaving or enter the city. They asked for higher fares or lower toll
charges. 






(3) Demonstrations against bus related regulations, working conditions (such as street insecurity) or other demands, particularly the ReplacementF u n dt o
replace old vintage vehicles they wanted the Government to create.
(5) Pico & Placa, the prohibition for public transport vehicles to circulate, based on the last digit of the shield number (placas); a measure designed to
reduce congestion.  20
required substantial financial resources and would have implied high opportunity costs to 
the Municipal Administration. Thus, choices of the local authorities regarding the best 
public transport system were partly determined from the outside. In fact, in 1999 only 
after a new National Government rejected the subway alternative for Bogotá did city 
authorities reveal their plans for TM
17. 
Facing a seemingly irreversible regime change, the traditional transporters were 
practically forced into participating. Also, the municipal government decided that any 
solution would be pursued in association with the traditional transporting firms of Bogotá. 
Hence, the actors who could be most negatively affected were not the big affiliating firms 
but the small bus owners and drivers. They reacted against the proposal and used 
strikes to block streets as a means of stopping its ratification (see Table 1), but the new 
coalition between the Municipal Government and the big firms defeated them. 
Additionally, the municipal government used the allocation of new routes in the non-TM 
corridors to reward or punish affiliating firms for their willingness to participate in TM 
through. Hence, the traditional transporters relocated their buses to other, new routes, 
granted by TM authorities. The choice was then not to abandon the old business in the 
proportion in which TM replaced them, but just relocation. This produced damaging 
effects on the other corridors in terms of speed, congestion, pollution, riding time, as it 
will be illustrated ahead. 
The TM system definitely changed the source and distribution of rents from bus public 
transport in Bogotá. First, for decades setting bus fares above marginal cost basically 
determined rents. Since bidding for TM is based on a minimum fare offered, and the TM 
contract determines fare variation, this source of rents is eliminated. This permanently 
changes the political economy of the sector. Second, on-the-road competition is 
eliminated because individual firms own buses (not routes), their running instructions are 
based on service demand, and the remuneration depends on the number of kilometers 
                                                 
17 In 1993 Bogotá undertook an institutional reform in accordance with the 1991 Colombian Constitution. 
This reform enhanced the powers of the mayor and reduced the influence of the city council. Prior to 1993, 
the city council greatly influenced public utilities and transportation policies. That reform made it easier to 
privatize public utilities, in particular the power generation and transmission company whose proceeds 
improved the city’s investment capacity. 
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and not on the number of passengers. Third, working as a unified firm leads TM to 
internalize the inefficiency of the previous decentralized, over-invested arrangement. 
Fourth, in terms of design, TM abides to the crucial conditions of an underground-type 
system: well-defined and enforceable curbside and road property rights. Allocating 
property rights via long-term concessions eliminated the Tragedy of the Commons. Fifth, 
TM eliminates the negative congestion externality on TM corridors.  
Some issues present potential vulnerabilities. As Estache and Gomez-Lobo (2004) 
indicate, the institutional capacity of the planning (national and municipal) authorities for 
defining the network configuration, quality requirements and service levels is crucial. 
One of the advantages of the existing private system is its flexibility to modify routes, 
cover new developing areas of the city, and bring bus routes closer to consumers. 
These challenges need to be answered satisfactorily now by good planning and 
regulation. The tendering system requires special care to ensure competition and avoid 
collusion among potential bidding concessionaires, as it has been argued in the case of 
Pereira, the second city of Colombia where a TM type is now being implemented. The 
application of contracts needs also to be monitored. This is particularly true for the 
revenue collection contract, whose performance is central to the system’s profitability. 
Recent events have shown other deficiencies as well. In particular, the number of daily 
passengers is claimed to have increased from 800 to 900 thousand and the number of 
vehicles on the road remains at the minimum. Passenger jamming became the rule, a 
particularly severe problem during peak hours. Long lines to purchase access cards 
were coupled with crowds waiting at the curb to enter the buses. People found it difficult 
to board the buses. Waiting time, a critical variable in any public transportation system 
and one of TM’s big achievements early on, started to rise. Security deteriorated and 
theft became common. As a result, people started to complain about the monopoly of 
TM
18.  
                                                 
18 “Transmi-Lleno” (“Transmi-full”) became slang for TM. On March 10, 2004, after an accident delayed for 
hours a long queue of TM buses, passengers decided to protest by sitting on the road. Currently 
overcrowding is worse than in the traditional bus system. On top of this, open fare competition by the still 
existing alternatives could present a challenge for TM, if traditional bus owners decide to reduce fares.  
   22
Additional vulnerabilities relating to financing and political support can be identified. TM 
depends on fiscal resources from the city and the nation. Political will as well as financial 
difficulties can prove an obstacle in the future. In this respect, it is interesting to evaluate 
the importance of personalities versus institutions for the creation and continuation of 
TM. If it is true that the creation of TM relied on the strong political will and credible 
threats by a group of transformers, during the last two municipal administrations the 
system’s institutional framework has strengthened. The proof came with the new 
national and municipal administrations that entered office in August 2002 and 2004, 
respectively. Some of their advocates criticized aspects of the TM system during the 
campaign, but once in office they embraced its functioning and defend it.  
Lastly, a democratically elected mayor appoints the head of the public company 
TransMilenio S.A. Thus, TM regulation could be contingent to political decisions. The 
system needs to strengthen an impersonal and institutionalized regulatory arrangement. 
Currently, across time one or two individuals may decide the future of the entire system, 
and only contracts hold their inter-temporal coherence. One of such decision might have 
involved the scraping process of the first lines of TM. This new hybrid model has 
vulnerabilities in several instances of the regulation which should be carefully considered 
and continuously monitored.  
4.   Cost-Benefit Analysis: The First Wave of Contracts 
The ultimate goal of TM is to improve the quality of life in Bogotá. Although only 25 percent 
of the system has been put in place so far, the impact is already indicative of what can be 
achieved. Travel times for TM passengers dropped and traffic congestion, air pollution, 
noise levels and frequency of traffic accidents decreased significantly in TM corridors. 
However, some unexpected negative spillovers have emerged. Traffic congestion and 
pollution have heightened along corridors not served by TM due to the slow scrapping rate 
of buses in the traditional public transit system. This section presents a cost-benefit 
analysis of the first wave of TM contracts
19.  
 
                                                 
19 The first wave of TM contracts covers 25 percent of the system.    23
4.1. The Impact of TM on the Quality of Life in Bogotá 
Soon after TM came into operation, many public transport users switched to this new 
alternative public transit mode. The year before the introduction of TM, 69 percent of 
individuals relied in public transportation. In 2001, after TM was available, six percent of 
individuals switched from traditional public services to the new alternative. This share of the 
population using TM has expanded constantly and, in 2003, the new system was the 
transportation alternative for 13 percent of the population
20. It is interesting to note however 
that TM has not increased the overall attractiveness of public transit since the share of the 
population using cars remained constant after the adoption of TM.  
Although demand for public transport stems mainly from the lower-income households, TM 
users are concentrated in the fourth and fifth income quintiles. Figure 5.a depicts transport 
mode by income quintile. Demand for buses is concentrated on the first, second and third 
quintile whereas use of private vehicles is restricted to the fourth and fifth income quintile. 
Demand for TM by income quintile is illustrated in graph 5.b. The highest income quintiles 
are the main users of TM.  
  
Source: authors calculations based on ECV (2003) 
The impact of TM on travel times and average speed varies widely across TM users, 
private vehicles and the traditional public transport system users. Two years after TM came 
into operation, the average trip time in Bogotá decreased to 35 minutes from 44 minutes in 
2001. The average speed of cars increased to 32.18 kilometers per hour from 27.03 
                                                 
20 The first phase of TM, that is 25 percent of the network, covers 13 percent of the public transport 
demand in Bogotá.  
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kilometers per hour in 2000 (Secretary of Transit and Transportation, 2003). Table 2 shows 
that the percentage of individuals who spent more than an hour traveling from home to 
work descended to 17 percent from 23 percent while the frequency of travel trips below one 
hour rose during 2003.  
Table 2. Time spent traveling from home to work,  
Percentage of individuals 
 
 2001 2002  2003 
Less than one hour  74% 68%  74% 
Between one and two hours 23% 29% 17% 
More than two hours  4% 2%  5% 
Source: Authors calculations based on Napoleon Franco 
However, the benefits of reductions in travel times accrued mainly to TM users. The 
average speed of other public transport actually dropped, which caused travel times to 
increase by ten percent (Lleras, 2003). Slow scrapping of buses from the traditional system 
may be causing the uneven distribution of benefits. These buses have relocated to 
corridors not served by TM, worsening congestion (Lleras, 2003).  
The impact of TM for public transports users, mainly upon travel times, is studied by Lleras 
(2003). A revealed preference survey was applied in 2002 to 2095 public transport riders 
that could choose between TM and the traditional system as transport modes. 
Respondents were interviewed in the street near areas where routes from the two systems 
run. The survey elicited information about the transport mode selected, the expected 
attributes of the trip, and some socio-economic characteristics. The data was used to 
estimate random utility models, which provide the coefficients to calculate the value of time 
for transport users of both systems in the different stages of the process (e.g. walk in and 
walk out time). 
Declines in travel times were not uniform across TM users. For passengers starting the trip 
in the vicinity of the main corridors, TM users travel 12 minutes less per trip compared to 
passengers of the traditional system. On the other hand, passengers requiring one or 
several transfers did not experience drops in travel times. In fact, total travel time is two 
minutes shorter in the traditional system due to waiting time required for the feeder routes 
(Lleras, 2003).    25
It is important to note however that waiting-in and waiting-out time increased for all TM 
users because these times are extremely low for the traditional bus system
21. While TM 
users have to buy tickets, wait in line, exit the station and walk to the final destination, users 
of the traditional system pay the bus driver, enter the bus at any location and stop the bus 
at the point nearest to their destination. Improvements in travel times arise, therefore, from 
in-vehicle travel time.  
Estimations of the value of time for TM passengers vis-à-vis users of the traditional system 
show unambiguous improvements in traveling conditions for the former. Overall, people are 
willing to pay more for savings in travel time than in the traditional system, indicating that 
TM is a less “painful” experience. For example, the value of waiting time for the traditional 
system is US$3.08 per hour while in TM it is US$1.14 per hour (Lleras, 2003).  
The figures analyzed above indicate that the first phase of TM enhanced travel conditions 
for a population group. While improvements should not be entirely attributed to the new 
mass transit system
22, the evidence is highly suggestive. Nevertheless, benefits from the 
new system are not distributed widely across the entire population; gains were perceived 
largely by TM users, in particular downtown dwellers.  
The quality of services also improved. Traffic accidents decreased dramatically in TM 
corridors. Figure 6 depicts the incidence of traffic collisions, pedestrian accidents, injuries 
and fatalities in TM corridors before and after the system came into operation. After two 
years, traffic collisions and pedestrian accidents decreased by 94 percent, passengers 
injured by 76 percent and fatalities by 94 percent. This is by all accounts an impressive 
performance.  
                                                 
21 For example, Llerras (2003) estimates that waiting-in and waiting-out time increased 2.95 and 5.16 
minutes for TM users vis-à-vis users of the traditional public transport system.  
22 Bogotá’s authorities implemented several programs to transform traffic conditions: mobilization 
restrictions during traffic peaks, investments in road infrastructure and higher traffic fines.    26
Figure 6. Traffic Accidents Before and After 
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Source: TM S.A. 
Lastly, air pollution, a major concern in Bogotá, exhibited a declining trend in TM corridors. 
Currently, half of the districts in the city exceed the Particulate Matter (PM-10) and Ozone 
pollution limits. Studies indicate automobiles, the most significant emission source in 
Bogotá, contribute 70 percent of air pollution (Cavallazi, 1996). Reductions in traffic 
congestion increased the speed of other vehicles, curbing emissions in TM corridors. In 
addition, TM appears to have improved air quality by transporting more passengers in less 
time and with better vehicles.  
This superior performance of TM vehicles, in contrast to traditional public buses, 
contributes to controlling mobile source emissions. TM buses transport 1,596 passengers 
daily, five times the number of traditional public buses, and the average speed is 17 to 44 
percent greater than the average speed in public transportation. Moreover, the average age 
of public buses is 15 years and maintenance, an important mechanism to reduce emissions 
from mobile sources, is rarely performed. On the other hand, TM buses have catalytic 
converters, emissions are below the limits required by the Euro II norm, some vehicles use 
natural gas and noise levels are less than 90 decibels (Ibáñez and Uribe, 2003).  
As stated, air pollution levels in TM corridors have decreased significantly. During the 
period 2000-2002, while the citywide average of Particulate Matter emissions grew by 23 
percent, it fell by 8 and 11 percent in the two TM corridors shown in Figure 7. However, the 
declining air pollution trend may not necessarily be the result of TM. During the last decade,   27
the environmental authorities of Bogotá have adopted a group of measures
23 to control air 
pollution that may have achieved effectively their objective.  
Figure 7. Average daily readings for particulate matter 
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Source: Authors calculations based on RMCAB
24 
Méndez (2004) analyzes the impact of several pollution programs implemented in Bogotá. 
The evolution of particulate matter and ozone in monitoring stations located near TM 
corridors and far from industrial areas was evaluated between the years 1997 to 2002. 
Categorical variables to denote the implementation of three policy interventions – the 
introduction of TM, mobilization restrictions and mandatory inspection and maintenance – 
were defined. Time series regressions to predict the trend of particulate matter and ozone 
levels and controlling for these policy interventions are estimated
25.  
Results reveal that TM is the most effective program for curbing pollution, in stark contrast 
to programs purposively designed to control emissions. While mandatory inspection and 
maintenance and restrictions in car mobilization reduce ozone levels by 13.6 and 21 
percent respectively, the first phase of TM produced a 28.8 percent decline in ozone levels. 
Similar estimations for particulate matter indicate TM abated pollution levels by 9.2 percent.  
                                                 
23 Measures include the use of catalytic converters for new cars, mandatory inspection and maintenance 
and mobilization restrictions. 
24 RMCAB stands for the network of air pollution monitoring stations in Bogotá. Thirteen monitoring 
stations, measuring hourly emissions for a group of pollutants, are located along Bogotá.  
25 To evaluate the impact of TM on emissions of Particulate Matter, a difference-in-differences analysis 
was carried out. The analysis seeks to compare readings from a monitoring station located near a TM 
corridor to readings at a baseline monitoring station. The baseline monitoring station should have two 
characteristics: (i) similar particulate matter readings to the TM monitoring station before entry into 
operation of the system; and (ii) location near a non-TM corridor without negative spillovers from 
relocation of buses. Unfortunately, it is practically impossible to find a monitoring station that satisfies both 
characteristics simultaneously.    28
Given that the slow scrapping rate of buses from the traditional system triggered the 
relocation of buses to non-TM corridors, in these areas the city experienced higher air 
pollution levels. The negative pollution spillovers of TM were evaluated using a difference-
in-difference approach. Two monitoring stations were selected based on the following 
criteria. First, particulate matter readings should be similar in both monitoring stations 
before the entry into operation of TM. Second, monitoring stations should not be located 
near industrial areas. Third, one monitoring station should be facing negative spillovers 
from relocation of buses and the other monitoring station should not be facing negative 
spillovers. The evolution of particulate matters in both monitoring stations is illustrated in 
Figure 8. After full entry into operation of TM in June 2001
26, particulate matter readings 
soared in the monitoring stations with negative spillovers while it remained constant in the 
monitoring station without the negative spillovers. The difference-in-difference calculations 
indicate that relocation of buses caused particulate matter emissions to increase by 10.5 
percent, more than offsetting the reductions in PM-10 readings in TM corridors.  
Figure 8. Particulate Matters Reading 1998-2002
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Source: authors calculations based on RMCAB 
Air pollution can seriously cause damages to health; particulate matter and ozone levels 
appear to increase the incidence of acute respiratory illnesses in Bogotá (Lozano, 2003). 
By estimating a concentration response function that link daily respiratory hospital 
admissions during 1998, the study finds a strong link between incidence of respiratory 
health admissions and particulate matter levels. In fact, a 25 percent increase in particulate 
                                                 
26 TM started partial operations in January 2001 and in June 2001 the full system with the three trunk 
corridors was put in place.   29
matter causes 21.8 percent more respiratory health admissions, but decreasing particulate 
matter emissions by 25 percent signifies a 17 percent reduction in health respiratory 
admissions.  
The impact of the first phase of TM reveals ambiguous results. On the one hand, travel 
times for TM users fell, safety improved, congestion dropped and air quality increased; yet 
these benefits are restricted to TM corridors and did not spread citywide. On the other 
hand, relocation of buses, as a result of slow scrapping rates, deteriorated congestion in 
non-TM corridors; causing a deterioration of traveling conditions for passengers of the 
traditional system, and of pollution levels. It is important to note that once the full system 
comes into operation the negative spillovers should decrease significantly or disappear. In 
2015, the full TM network will be completed and will cover 80 percent of public transport 
demand in Bogotá. Notwithstanding, negative spillovers of TM should be taken into account 
when implementing the next phases.  
4.2. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Understanding the welfare gains and losses from the introduction of TM is crucial to 
evaluate whether investments in this new scheme derived in net benefits for the population, 
and to identify future adjustments to the system. Welfare changes can be approximated 
measuring variations in the consumer and producer surplus caused by the adoption of TM. 
The previous information along with data on investments, costs and revenues of the 
system’s operation was utilized to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. Only the first phase of 
TM – 25 percent of the system – was evaluated. Ideally, the analysis should estimate the 
consumer and producer surplus before and after TM, and then proceed to calculate the 
changes in both surpluses; yet restrictions on the data only made it possible to calculate 
changes in both surpluses as a result of the adoption of the system. A detailed description 
of the assumptions and methodology used to perform the analysis is included in Appendix 
II. Table 3 presents a summary of results
27. 
The CBA analysis incorporates revenues and costs from the operation of TM as well as 
initial investment. Operational information comprises revenues from fare collections, 
                                                 
27 Detailed calculations of the cost-benefits are available upon request.    30
operational costs for concessionaires, fare collection expenses, administrative expenditures 
of TransMilenio S.A and management costs for the fiduciary. Infrastructure investments 
and maintenance costs of corridors are also incorporated.  
The foregone revenues of firms operating previously in TM corridors were also calculated. 
Before TM came into operation, near 6080 buses operated in those corridors; 
approximately 1410 were scrapped and the remaining 4670 were relocated to unserved TM 
corridors. Foregone revenues were estimated for the former whereas revenues for the 
latter are incorporated because the operation of these buses did not stop. 
Welfare losses and gains from variations in travel times for users of TM and the traditional 
system were estimated. All stages involved when traveling from one destination to another 
were considered: waiting time, in-vehicle travel time as well as walking-in and walking-out 
time. Lleras (2003) calculated the value of time for each stage. Public transport demand 
was divided in two groups: (i) users that require one or more transfers; and (ii) users that 
travel directly to their destination. Values were calculated for both segments.  
Benefits and costs associated with changes in particulate matter levels were estimated. 
Figures from emissions reductions in TM corridors were extracted from Méndez (2004). 
Emission increases from negative spillovers were calculated using a difference-in-
differences approach. The impact of particulate matter pollution on incidence of acute 
respiratory illnesses was calculated based on a concentration-response function estimated 
by Lozano (2003) for Bogotá. Changes in the incidence of Acute Respiratory Illness as a 
consequence of TM were valued using willingness to pay for reductions in respiratory 
health admissions reported by Lozano (2003).  
Lastly, gains from drops in traffic fatalities in TM corridors are calculated. The risk of death 
before and after TM was estimated based on the number of passengers and the number of 
deaths. The Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) for Chile reported in Bowland and Beghin 
(1998) was adjusted for Colombia using the GNP per capita for both countries.  
Many benefits accruing from TM were not incorporated in the analysis due to data 
restrictions. First, higher property values for houses located on TM corridors are not 
considered. Second, gains from traffic collisions and injuries reported in Figure 6. were not   31
included since no data is available to approximate welfare gains from these events. Third, 
petty thefts and general insecurity fell significantly in TM corridors but data to calculate 
welfare benefits from increased security is not available.  
The net present value of the cost-benefit analysis is presented for different discount rates in 
3. Results reveal net benefits from the first phase of TM are negative and equal to US$64 
million for a discount rate of nine percent. High infrastructure investments not recovered by 
fares and increases in travel times for users of the traditional system, as a consequence of 
relocation of buses, drive these results. Infrastructure investments and costs to traditional 
system users account for 66 and 25 percent of negative net benefits respectively. Pollution 
in non-TM corridors also reduces benefits, but contributions are not significant and are 
partially offset by drops in pollution in TM corridors. Benefits stemming from less in-vehicle 
travel time for TM users, operational revenues and reductions in mortality, although 
significant, are not sufficient to cover these costs.  
Negative spillovers are the results of three features of the current mass transit system of 
Bogotá. First, only 25 percent of the TM network has been constructed so far. Because the 
TM network is only partially operating, the benefits arising from the economics of 
coordination and density are not being exploited fully. Second, scrapping rates required on 
the first phase of TM contracts were insufficient. As a result, buses previously operating in 
TM corridors were not scrapped and relocated to unserved corridors heightening 
congestion. Lastly, high fares and imperfect controls on the entry of new buses of the 
traditional public system promoted the entry of new buses and slowed the exit of old ones. 
Fares are still excessively high and are an incentive for entry of new buses. In addition, 
controls for the entry of new buses are difficult to enforce, allowing for the operation of 
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Table 3. Cost-Benefit Analysis with Infrastructure Costs 
Millions of dollars 2002 
7% 9% 12%
-15,65 -11,73 -9,12
Foregone Operational Costs - Traditional System 12,27 9,20 7,15
Revenues -Relocated Buses 12,02 9,01 7,00


















Benefits due to reductions in mortality
Net Present Value
Costs due to increase in Travel Time for Traditional System users - Non transfer
Travel time costs for Traditional System users - Transfer
Costs asocciated with a 10.5% increase in PM10 in traditional corridors
Benefits associated with a 9.1% reduction in PM10 in TM corridors
Costs due to increase in Walking In and Out Time for TM - Non transfer
Costs due to increase in Walking In and Out Time for TM - Transfer
Benefits associated with reductions in Travel Time for TM - Non transfer
Benefits associated with reductions in Travel Time  for TM - Transfer
Maintenance Costs
Costs due to increase in Waiting Time for TM - Non transfer
Costs due to increase in Waiting Time for TM - Transfer
Revenues - TransMilenio
Operational Costs - TransMilenio
Infrastructure Costs
Foregone Revenues - Traditional System
 
Source: Authors calculations. 
 
Two important caveats about the results should be mentioned. Some benefits such as 
increased property values, fewer traffic accidents and better security in TM corridors are 
not incorporated into the analysis due to data restrictions, and would certainly change the 
results. TM is a network and only 25 percent of it has been put in place. Because TM will 
serve the vast majority of the road network, negative spillovers from relocation of buses 
should disappear gradually once the network is complete. In fact, the second wave of 
contracts defined more stringent requirements for scrapping rates.  
Notwithstanding, the analysis sheds some light on drawbacks of the TM system that can be 
adjusted for the next phases. First, the design of the system should take into account 
negative spillovers to the traditional public transport system in order to minimize them. Both 
systems – TM and the traditional system – should not operate separately but jointly as an 
integrated mass transit system. Lastly, prevailing incentives such as high fares that spur 
entry of new buses, despite the fact that many buses travel empty, should be eliminated 
(Castro et al, 2001).  
The National and Local Government provided the bulk of infrastructure investment. Street 
pavement, most of which would have been done anyhow, and is the responsibility of the 
city authorities, constitutes a significant share of this investment. Moreover, the intervention 
on TM corridors includes a full renovation of two lanes for private cars and the curbside.   33
Therefore, benefits from this investment not only accrue to TM providers and users, but to 
others groups of the population. In addition, imposing on TM the obligation of recovering 
the infrastructure investments or its maintenance costs would have rendered TM unfeasible 
because profitability would have been negative, eliminating the participation of the private 
sector. The National and Local authorities viewed the public provision of infrastructure as 
sunk costs and subsidies to the population to promote a more efficient public transit 
system. Based on those arguments, Table 4 presents the CBA analyses without public 
investment.  
 
Table 4. Cost Benefit Analysis without Infrastructure Costs 
Millions of dollars of 2002 
7% 9% 12%
-15.65 -11.73 -9.12
Foregone Operational Costs - Traditional System 11.65 8.73 6.79
Revenues - Relocated Buses 12.02 9.01 7.00

















Costs due to increase in Waiting Time for TM - Non transfer
Costs due to increase in Waiting Time for TM - Transfer
Item
Forgone Revenues - Traditional System
Revenues - TransMilenio
Operational Costs - TransMilenio
Costs due to increase in Walking In and Out Time for TM - Non transfer
Costs due to increase in Walking In and Out Time for TM - Transfer
Benefits associated with reductions in Travel Time for TM - Non Transfer
Benefits associates with reductions in Travel Time  for TM - Transfer
Benefits due to reductions in mortality
Net Present Value
Costs due to increase in Travel Time for Traditional System users - Non Transfer
Travel time costs for Traditional System users - Transfer
Costs asocciated with a 10.5% increase in PM10 in traditional corridors
Benefits associated with a 9.1% reduction in PM10 in TM corridors
 
Source: Authors calculations.  
Even without public investment, results for the CBA analysis continue to be negative. In this 
case, outcomes are mainly caused by the negative spillovers imposed by TM upon 
passengers of the traditional public transport system. Currently, TM covers 13 percent of 
the public transport demand whereas the public transport system covers 87 percent. TM 
indeed improved the traveling conditions of its users, but worsened the conditions of a high 
proportion of the population: users of the traditional public transport system. This is not 
implying TM is not a good alternative. On the contrary, TM should be expanded rapidly to 
improve traveling conditions of other public transport users, and to reduce the negative 
spillovers.    34
5. Conclusions 
TransMilenio has become a cornerstone in the history of urban public transport in 
Colombia. Nowadays at least five Colombian cities above 500 thousand people are 
applying for central government resources in order to replicate the system implemented by 
Bogotá and other cities in Latin America are planning to follow suit. In its origin, TM itself 
mimicked the experiences of Curitiba and Quito, but it introduced some novelties that have 
become its trademark. The new transit system is a hybrid model that combines public 
planning of the network structure, route tendering conditions, regulation and supervision, as 
well as private operation of the separated functions of revenue collection and transport 
service. Among them, the financial fiduciary management, the separation between the 
private providers which simultaneously administers the firm TransMilenio S.A.; the flexible 
contracts for bus operation; the separation between feeder buses and regular buses 
concessions; the payment per kilometer instead of per passenger; the definition of property 
rights for the road and the curbside; and the choice of the left, faster lanes for it, are the 
most salient. However, as always, the true test of the pudding is in the tasting, and we can 
say that in many respects TM has been a success worth being copied itself in other Latin 
American and Asian cities.  
This aggressive initiative had been previously analyzed from different points of view, but 
this paper is the first attempt to conduct a full economic account of its origin, design, 
political economy and a cost-benefit analysis. Surprisingly, the cost-benefit analysis for the 
first phase is negative. The new organization had a sizeable impact on TM users’ by 
improving traveling conditions significantly. In addition, congestion, pollution and traffic 
accidents plummeted in TM corridors. However, the type of transition adopted for the 
remaining transport corridors not covered by TM caused unforeseen negative spillovers, as 
a consequence of slow scrapping rates and bus and routes relocation. Consequently, 
although the CBA for the first phase of the corridors covered by TM is positive, once these 
additional measures are taken into consideration, the net effect is negative due primarily to 
increases in travel time for passengers using the traditional transport system. In order to 
minimize the negative spillovers during the full implementation of TM, expected to last until   35
2015, integration of the traditional and new systems should be carried on, and strict 
regulation of the traditional public transport system should be crafted.    36
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Appendix I: Econometric Estimates for Rents 
In order to calculate the economic rents for affiliating firms and bus drivers, the demand 
per vehicle and the income per passenger were estimated using time series regressions. 
Two approaches were utilized. The first approach estimates an OLS regression that 
corrects for autocorrelation. The second approach estimates an ARMAX model. 
 
The observed demand per vehicle is estimated with a distributed lagged model where a 





where qt is the daily number of passengers per vehicle, qt-1 is the lagged daily number of 
passengers and vt represents the number of buses. Several models were estimated. 
The model that best approximates the functional form is presented table I.1. 
 
Table I.1 Econometric estimates of demand 
Coefficient OLS model  ARMAX Model 
β0  605.2 123.34 




δ   0.3363** 
SS  40648.9 6003.83 
E(εt)  0.24* =  0 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
All are significant to 1% unless otherwise specified  
SS: Sum of the square of the errors 
E(εt)=0, Implies that autocorrelation does not persist 
*Value of Durbin Watson 
** Significant at 2%    
 
The ARMAX model provides the best estimation and autocorrelation is eliminated. The 
signs of the coefficients are as expected. β0 is equivalent to autonomous demand, β1 
incorporates the influence of prior periods and β2 the influence of size of the total fleet, 
which is negative in all the estimates.  
 
To estimate income per passenger the production function curve for a congestion good 




where Y represents the income per passenger, which is a variable that approximates the 
fare. To correct for autocorrelation, ARMAX and AR1 models were estimated. The 
results are presented in Table I.2. 
ε ε β β β δ
1
2
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Table I.2. Econometric estimates of income per passenger 
 
 OLS  AR  1    ARMAX 
α0  52.8123 21.4539 33.5797 
α1  -0.1212x10
-1 -0.5918x10










δ   0.9674  0.8316 
SS  284.49 139.77 137.78 
E(εt)  0.7466*  ≠ 0  = 0 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
SS: Sum of the square of the errors 
E(εt)=0, Implies that autocorrelation does not persist 
*Value of Durbin Watson 
** Significant at 2%    
 
To calculate rents, gains and costs to each vehicle should be calculated. Gains are 
determined by the number of vehicles in circulation for which a production function of the 
public transport sector is defined. Costs per vehicle are determined and include fuel 
expenses, spare parts replacement, maintenance, depreciation, insurance costs, taxes 
and purchase value of the vehicle
28. The average cost per vehicle was calculated for 
each year. Rents for the affiliating firms are estimated by adding up the benefits for the 
buses they owned, revenues from routes allocations and the operational costs.  
 
Contracts between the affiliating firm and bus owners are simulated by maximizing 
benefits from affiliating firms subject to positive benefits for the bus owners. The optimal 
number of vehicles per affiliating firm, the affiliation fee as well as rents for the affiliating 
firm and bus owners are obtained.  
 
                                                 
28 The prevailing interest rate for each year was used.   40
Appendix II: Methodology of the Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
1.  The analysis was performed for the length of the first wave of the contract: 2000-
2015. 
2.  All values are in US$ millions of 2002. 
3.  Revenues for Transmilenio: Number of TM users multiplied by the technical fare. 
For 2001, 2002 and 2003 observed values for number of passengers reported by 
TransMilenio S.A. were used. For 2004 onwards, the revenues were calculated 
assuming that the number of passengers increased with the population growth rate 
projected by DANE.  
4.  Revenues for Traditional System Buses:  
a. The number of passengers on Caracas and Avenida 80 corridors before 
TransMilenio was taken from the National Department of Statistics (DANE) for 
1996 and adjusted for 2001 using population growth rates for Bogotá.  
b. Revenues and costs per passenger for the different types of buses that 
operated in these trunk corridors before TransMilenio were taken from Castro 
et al (2001) 
c.  The estimation of the number of buses that operated in these trunk corridors 
was based upon the number of routes in these corridors and the average 
number of buses per route. This information was provided by Express del 
Futuro, one of the concessionaires of TM. Approximately 6080 buses 
operated in these corridors.  
d.  Transmilenio S.A. reported that for every TransMilenio bus that entered the 
system, three traditional system buses were scrapped. Near 470 
TransMilenio buses came in operation, so consequently, 1410 were 
effectively scrapped; this corresponds to 23.2% of the buses that operated in 
these corridors. The remaining 76.8% of the traditional system buses is 
assumed to have relocated to other corridors.  
e.  The foregone revenues for the traditional system buses was calculated as the 
number of passengers multiplied by the revenue per passenger for buses in 
Caracas and Avenida 80 corridors.  
f.  Gains due to foregone operational costs of traditional buses previously 
operating in TM corridors was calculated as the number of passengers 
multiplied by the operational cost per passenger for buses in Caracas and 
Avenida 80 corridors.  
g. Operational revenues for buses of the traditional system that relocated to 
unserved TM corridors were calculated as the revenues for buses of the 
traditional system multiplied by the percentage of buses that relocated to 
other corridors (76.81%). 
h. Operational costs for buses of the traditional system that relocated to 
unserved TM corridors were calculated as the operational costs of traditional 
buses multiplied by the percentage of buses that relocated to other corridors 
(76.81%). 
5.  Population growth rates: For 2004 and 2005, rates projected by DANE were used. 
For 2006 onwards, the average population growth for 2001-2005 was used. 
6.  Operational Costs:    41
a.  Feeder lines cost: Number of passengers in the feeder lines multiplied by 
the feeder rate per passenger. Observed values reported by TransMilenio 
S.A. were used for 2001, 2002 and 2003. For 2004 onwards, the number of 
passengers increases by the population growth rate.  
b.  Trunk corridor cost: Number of km. multiplied by bus fare per km. Observed 
values reported by TransMilenio S.A. were used for 2001, 2002 and 2003.  
c.  Fare collection costs: Calculated as a rate per passenger multiplied by the 
number of passengers. Observed values reported by TransMilenio S.A. were 
used for 2001, 2002 and 2003. For 2004 onwards, number of passengers 
grew with population growth rate.  
d.  Operational costs for TransMilenio S.A: three percent over the technical 
fare multiplied by the number of passengers. Observed values reported by 
TransMilenio S.A. were used for 2001, 2002 and 2003. For 2004 onwards, 
the number of passengers grew with population growth rate.  
e.  Fiduciary contract cost: 0.0387% of total revenues 
7.  Infrastructure costs: Values reported by Lleras (2003) for the First Phase of TM. 
Costs include: trunk corridors, bus stations, bus terminals, access to stations, bus 
depots, operations control center, buses and others. 
8.  Maintenance Costs: Total maintenance costs reported by IDU-TM.  
9.  Time Costs: 
a.  Waiting Time Costs: The value of time was extracted from Lleras (2003). 
Increases in waiting time were calculated as the difference between TM and 
traditional system users waiting time. This figure was multiplied by the value 
of waiting time for TM users and the number of TM users.  
b.  Walking In and Out Time Costs: The value of time was extracted from 
Lleras (2003). Increases in walking in and out times were calculated as the 
difference between TM and traditional system users walking in and out times. 
This figure was multiplied by the value of walking time for TM users times the 
number of TM users. 
c.  In vehicle travel time: The value of time was extracted from Lleras (2003). 
Drops in in-vehicle travel time were calculated as the difference between TM 
and traditional system users in-vehicle travel time. This figure was multiplied 
by the value of travel time for traditional system users and the number of 
traditional system users. 
d.  Travel time for users of the traditional system: The value of time was 
extracted from Lleras (2003). Increases in travel time for users of the 
traditional system amount to ten percent according to Lleras (2003). This 
increase was multiplied by the value of travel time for traditional system users 
and the number of traditional system users.  
e.  All times were assumed to remain constant over the period of analysis.  
f.  For TM times, all times were calculated for two segments of the population. 
Segment one includes users whose trips originated in the vicinity of the Trunk 
Corridors and therefore did not need to make transfers, i.e. those who do not 
use feeder lines. Following Lleras (2003) 55 percent of the population belongs 
to segment one. The remaining 45% belong to Segment 2, which includes 
those who start their trips in areas served by feeder lines and, therefore, have 
to engage in one or several transfers.   42
g.  For traditional system times, all times were calculated for two segments of the 
population. Segment one includes those who only take one bus to their 
destination; 55% of the population belongs to segment one. The remaining 
45% belongs to segmented two, which includes those who take two or more 
buses in order to arrive to their destinations.  
10. Air pollution 
a.  Reductions in PM-10 associated with TM operations in trunk corridors were 
based on Mendez (2004). 
b.  Emissions reductions in TM corridors are supposed to benefit 20 percent of 
the population.  
c.  Difference-in-differences analysis was conducted to find the increases in PM-
10 associated with traffic spillovers to non-TM corridors.  
d.  Emissions increases in TM corridors are supposed to affect 20 percent of the 
population. 
11. Reductions in mortality:  
a. VSL estimates for Chile (Bowland and Beghin, 1998) were adjusted for 
Colombia using the GNP per capita of both countries.  
b.  The risk of death for public transport users before TM was calculated as the 
number of deaths divided by the number of users.  
c.  The risk of death for public transport users after TM was calculated as the 
number of deaths divided by the number of users.  
12. Net present value: Social discount rates of 7%, 9.33% and 12% were used to 
calculate TM’s net present value.  
 
  